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The households included in the 1988-89 ABS Household Expenditure Survey
were grouped according to size, degree of labour force participation, and weekly
household private income. Households at similar levels of income were then
compared to determine the effect on disposable income of a small increase in
labour market earnings, resulting in higher taxes paid and lower benefits received.
A wide range of direct and indirect taxes and direct and indirect benefits was
included in the calculation. Effective marginal tax rates were calculated as the
ratio of increased taxes plus reduced benefits to the postulated increase in
earnings. Effective marginal tax rates were found to be generally higher for
households in the bottom half of the household disposable income distribution
than in the top half.
1. INTRODUCTION
Australia's system of welfare payments is intended to be targeted at those groups
considered to be in need. Many types of payments are means tested, including all
major social security and veterans pensions and allowances, although the income
thresholds vary from one type of payment to another. On the tax side, the income
tax system is designed partly with ability to pay in mind. The combined effect of
the tax/transfer system is to generate relatively high effective marginal tax rates
(EMTRs) at low levels ofincome. The EMTR is the extra tax paid plus the reduction
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in means tested benefits received as a result of a one dollar increase in private
income. High EMTRs are of concern because they act as a disincentive to work,
with obvious effects on the efficiency of resource use, and because they make it
difficult for people to raise their after-tax, after-transfer income through their own
efforts, thereby perpetuating poverty traps.
Various studies have used estimates ofEMTRs to analyse the efficiency and
effectiveness of income redistribution measures, or to estimate the efficiency
effects of the tax system. Australian studies include an analysis of income
redistribution by Bascand and Porter (1986), and an estimate of the cost of public
funds by Findlay and Jones (1982). Both of these studies need to be up-dated to take
account ofsignificant changes in the tax-transfer system which have occurred in the
last decade. Harding and Polette (1995) have recently published estimates of the
EMIRs experienced by individuals ranked by dedle of equivalent disposable
family income. Harding and Palette's estimates are not ideally suited for analysing
the labour supply effects of changes in the tax/transfer system for several reasons.
First, their estimated EMTRs are for families whereas labour supply elasticities are
generally estimated for individuals or households. Secondly, they group families
in d,~ciles according to equivalent disposable family income - income adjusted for
family composition and size according to the Henderson poverty equivalence scale
(Saunders (1994) Ch. 8) - whereas labour supply studies are usually based on
disposable income. Thirdly, they omit certain categories of taxes and transfers from
their calculations: indirect taxes are excluded as are indirect benefits in the fDIm of
goods and services supplied by government to households.
The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative set ofEMTR estimates for
households grouped hy disposable household income deciles which is derived from
the 1988-89 Household Expenditure Survey (ABS (1992» and which incorporates
the effects ofindirect taxes and benefits; to compare these estimates with the results
of the Harding and Palette and previous studies; and to discuss briefly the
implications of the results for the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax-transfer
system.
2. ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES
Our estimates ofEMTRs are derived from the 1988-89 ABS Household Expenditure
Survey (HES) data consisting of demographic information, earnings, taxes paid
and transfers received for a sample of7225 households. These unit record data are
derived from the same survey used to generate the ABS occasional publications
6537.0 "Household Expenditure Survey, Australia, The Effects of Government
Benefits and Taxes on Household Income" and 6533.0 "Household Expenditure
Survey, Australia, States and 1 erritories". Information about direct benefits, such
as age, invalid, Veterans Affairs and sole parent pensions, unemployment benefits,
farr:.ily allowances and other payments such as sickness benefits and education
assistance is obtained directly from household responses to the HES. Various
models are used to calculate the incidence of direct and indirect taxes and indirect
benefits across household income deciles. The operation of these models is
des:ribed briefly below, and a full description is available in Schneider (unpub).
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Direct taxes, including personal income tax and medicare levies, were imputed
to households according to the 1988-89 tax schedule, with rebates calculated
according to household characteristics and tax eligibility criteria. Corporate taxes
were not allocated to households (EPAC (1995». Indirect taxes, defined as those
taxes charged on "the production, sale, purchase or use of goods and services"
(ABS (l992a» included customs and excise duties, sales taxes, payroll taxes,
primary production taxes, liquor and gambling taxes, motor vehicle taxes, stamp
duties, broadcast and television station licences, regulatory service fees, and some
other categories of fees, fines and taxes. Expenditure information obtained from the
HES was translated to expenditure by the input-outputc1assification ofcommodities,
and then to values of industry output by means of the input-output model. Indirect
taxes as a component of the value of industry output were then allocated to
households by means of the industry-commodity matrix and the information on
commodity expenditures by households, on the assumption that the incidence of
indirect taxes was fully shifted to households.
Indirect benefits consist of Commonwealth, State and Local Government
outlays on education, health, social security and welfare (excluding personal
benefit payments), and housing. Government outlays on school, tertiary and special
education were used to calculate an estimate of average student benefit for each
type of student in each State or Territory; the average student benefits were then
allocated to households on the basis of demographic information obtained from the
HES and other surveys. Government outlays on hospitals, clinics, other institutional
and non-institutional services and benefits, public health, pharmaceuticals, medical
aids and appliances and research were allocated to individuals by means of hospital
utilization and doctor visit rates according to age, sex and State or Territory of
residence. The individual benefits were then allocated to households using the
information contained in the HES. Social security and welfare outlays consist of
sickness benefits, benefits to ex-servicemen and theirdependents, invalid and other
pennanentdisablement benefits, old age benefits, widows, deserted wives, divorcees
and orphans benefits, unemployment benefits, family and child benefits, sole
parents benefits, family and child welfare, and miscellaneous payments. The values
of these outlays, together with data on the number of eligible recipients, are used
to calculate the average benefit for each beneficiary category and the average
benefits are allocated to households on the basis of information obtained from the
HES. Housing benefits include benefits to households with government rental
properties, and allocated benefits to first home buyers. The benefits to households
with government rental properties were calculated as a proportion of the difference
between the estimated private market rent and the actual rent paid. Private market
rents, according to State, region, type of dwelling, structure and number of
bedrooms, were obtained from the 1986 Census and inflated to December 1988 by
means of the CPI, and actual rent paid was obtained from the HES.
As noted above, the EMTR is defined as the ratio of change in taxes paid less
the change in value of benefits received to a small increase in household private
income. Since taxes generally increase, and benefits fall, as income rises, the
EMTR measures the increase in net taxes (ie. change in taxes less change in
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benefits) expressed as a proportion of the income increase. EMTRs are calculated
by comparing the tax and benefit experience of households with different levels of
private income. Since characteristics such as household size, number of wage
earners and household head aged 65 years or over affect taxes paid and benefits
received independently of the level of private income, comparisons are conducted
between households which are similar in respect to these major characteristics. An
EMTR is calculated for each household type and private income level and
households are then sorted into disposable income deciles and average EMTRs are
calculated for each dedle as described below.
The unit record data for households whose head was less than 65 years of age
were divided into 24 subsets of households with the same number of household
members and employed persons. A further 11 subsets were formed from households
whose head was aged 65 years or over. Within each of the subsets, households were
ranked according to weekly private income. They were then grouped in $50ranges,
to reflect the likely size of a change in earnings as a result of a marginal change in
labour supply, and average private income, benefits and taxes were calculated for
each group. Where a $50 range included a group of fewer than five households a
wider range was used. A comparison of the average values of private income, taxes
and benefits for each group with the average for the group in the preceding income
range in the subset was used to calculate the EMTR for that group. This method of
calculation meant that the households grouped in the lowest income range in each
subset dropped out of the sample as there was no preceding group with which they
could be compared. Each household in each income range in each subset was
assigned the EMTR for that group and the subsets were then merged into a single
sample.
The sample households, with their estimated EMTRs, were then assigned to
disposable household income deciles where disposable income is defined as private
income plus direct benefits less direct taxes paid. Sample average EMTRs are
calculHed for each disposable income decile and reported in Column 2 of Table 1;
sample sizes are reported in Column 6.
It will be recalled that each household was allocated the average EMTR
calculated for its income band within its demographic group. Since there are 35
demographic groups and an average of 12.5 income bands within each group, there
is a total of 403 band/group clusters (net of the lowest band in each group) and the
same c.umber of EMTR estimates. When a household is assigned to a disposable
income decile it takes with it the average EMTR of its cluster. This means that the
same cluster average EMTR may appear more than once in the sample of EMTRs
for a disposable income decile. The variance of the average EMTR in a disposable
income decile is calculated as a weighted average of the variances of the cluster
average EMTRs found in the decile, where the weights are the squares of the ratios
of the number of observations drawn from each cluster to the total number of
observations in the dedle. The variance of the cluster EMTR is calculated as
where cr(i)2 is the variance of EMTRs within cluster i, n is the number of
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observations in the cluster, and i and i-I refer to cluster i and the one immediately
below it. This method of calculating the variance of the EMTR estimates obtained
for each decile involves assuming that the observations in each cluster are randomly
drawn from a normally distributed population, and that (he covariances between
means of adjacent clusters are zero.
The standard deviations of the EMTR estimates for the disposable income
deciles are reported in Table I, Column 3. The estimates are relatively high,
especially for the first three deciles. This reflects the wide range of different
circumstances faced by households in lower income bands, even within broadly
similar demographic groups. Based on t-ratio one-tail tests the EMTRs estimated
for deciles 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level of
significance.
3, COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES
Our results can be compared with the earlier studies of Findlay and Jones (1982)
and Bascand and Porter (1986). Findlay and Jones report unweighted EMTRs for
households grouped according to 12 grades of taxable income in 1978-79. The
EMTRs are obtained by adding the marginal income tax rate to average rates of
indirect tax computed by Warren (1979). Findlay and Jones report lower EMTRs
than our estimates for lower income groups, and higher EMTRs for the higher
TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE EMTRs FROM TWO STUDIES
Present Study Harding!
Palette
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Disposable Unweighted Sample Weighted Sample Sample EMTR
Income EMTR Standard EMTR Standard Size
Decile* Deviation Deviation
1 .619 3.1974 .327 0.1331 385 .06
2 .732 2.0581 .327 0.0029 479 .23
3 .585 1.6371 .441 0.0015 593 .35
4 .678 0.3620 .703 0.0013 664 .32
5 .563 0.0959 .553 0.0007 691 .29
6 .483 0.1082 .484 0.0004 710 .31
7 .365 0.3268 .369 0.0015 697 .30
8 .435 0.6323 .445 0.0026 720 .32
9 .429 0.1601 .432 0.0002 715 .36
10 .423 0.1574 .427 0.0001 724 .38
6378
* Note that famlhes were grouped by D1Spos.::J.ble Equlvatent Family Inome m 6e Hardmg and Polette
study. and by Disposable Household Income Decile in the Campbell and Bond study. Weighted
EMTRs are the sum of household EMTRs weighted by household shares in the labour earnings of the
decile.
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income groups. The higher EMTRs in the Findlay and Jones study are prohahly
explained by the more progressive income tax structure which existed in 1978-79,
while the lower EMTRs are prohably explained by the fact that our calculations take
account ofbenefits as well as taxes. Bascand and Porter(1986) use 1981-82Income
and Housing Survey data to calculate EMTRs for beneficiary and pensioner
households, and for gross income quintiles of non-pensioner, non-beneficiary
households. Their coverage of taxes and benefits is similar to ours except that they
impute corporation and payroll taxes to households, but do not appear to impute
indirect benefits. They report a structure ofEMTRs which is less progressive than
that estimated by Findlay and Jones, but more progressive than the structure we
obtain from our approach.
A contemporary study for comparison is that of Harding and Palette (1995).
Before comparing results, however, it should be noted that our study differs from
theirs in several respects. Harding and Palette's calculations are based on the 1990
ABS Income Distribution Survey unit records, whereas our study is hased on the
1988-89 HES. Also, in the former study, the Income Distribution Survey records
were "aged" to provide estimates for 1994 and the sampled households ....were
regrouped as a series of families (see Palette (1995) for details). Certain groups
were excluded from their sample: those deemed to be unlikely to be in the labour
force - principally children and persons aged 65 or over; and those whose family
income was marginally below the threshold for the basic family payment income
test. The effect on family disposable income of a change in earnings was estimated
by simulating the effect of a one dollar increase in the earnings of each parent on
the family's tax liability and entitlement to transfers. In contrast, no households
were excluded from our initial sample, households were grouped according to
household private income, and EMTRs were measured by comparing the taxi
transfer experience of households similar in composition and income.
Harding and Polette's estimates, which are reported in Column 7 of Table 1,
are generally lower than ours, but the high sample standard deviations associated
with our results and the absence of estimates of standard deviations of their
estimates precludes a formal comparison. In particular our study finds evidence of
much higher average EMTRs in the lower income deciles. There are several
possihle reasons for this: first, the comparison ofEMTRs for disposable household
income deciles with those for equivalent disposable family income deciles can only
be approximate; secondly, our EMTRs include estimates of the effect of changes
in indirect taxes paid and benefits received as private income increases; thirdly,
Harding and Polette excluded from their sample a small number offamilies on the
threshold of the family payment income test who may have faced very high
EMTRs; and, finally, Harding and Polette excluded families whose labour force
parljcipation was likely to have been low.
Our EMTR estimates can be adjusted to reflect labour force participation hy
calculating weighted average EMTRs for each decile where the weights are the
share of each household in the lahour earnings of the decile. The weighted EMTRs
are reported in Column 4 of Table 1 and the sample standard deviations in Column
5. The weighting has little effect on the EMTR estimates for households in higher
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income deciles suggesting that the tax-transfer system is not a significant deterrent
to labour force participation for these groups. For households in the three lowest
deciles weighting substantially lowers the estimated EMTRs: households whose
members are not in the labour force because of age or inability to work tend to be
found in the lower income deciles and tend to have high EMTRs because of benefit
programmes; and some households whose members have low earning capacity
may self-select out of the labour force because they face high EMTRs; since these
groups of households with relatively high EMTRs report no labour earnings they
receive no weight in the calculation of the weighted average. The sample standard
deviations are significantly lower than in the unweighted case: all estimates are
significantly different from zero, and this probably reflects a greater degree of
homogeneity among households participating in the labour force than in the sample
of households as a whole.
4, CONCLUSIONS
Our results suggest that the structure of EMTRs is highly regressive as a result of
Australia's targeted welfare system. The structure of EMTRs reported in Table I
also indicates that the target is fairly broad: the EMTRs suggest that at least half of
the households in the country are beneficiaries of one scheme or another. The high
EMTRs at the lower end of the income distribution may not, by themselves, be a
source of substantial inefficiency: for many households they are a result of an
inability to work, and the average potential earnings of those households which
choose not to work because of excessively high EMTRs are likely to be low. On the
other hand, the broader the target the larger is the amount of tax revenue required
to finance the benefit programmes: with one exception, EMTRs are consistently in
excess of 40 percent in the higher income deciles which contribute the bulk of the
tax revenues. Reductions in the quantity of labour supplied by these high earning
households as a result of high EMTRs are likely to involve significant economic
losses. A recent study by Campbell and Bond (1997b), updating the Bascand and
Porter study, and using weighted average EMTRs for gross income deciles,
estimated that a marginal expansion of the tax-transfer system would cost$1.76 for
each dollar transferred to net gainers.
The magnitude and structure of the EMTRs also have implications for the
provision of public goods. Whether financed through taxation or borrowing, public
good provision involves either increasing or not reducing tax revenues. Estimates
of EMTRs, together with estimates of labour supply elasticities can be used to
calculate the additional dead-weight loss associated with a marginal expansion of
the tax-transfer system. An increase in EMTRs, with the quantity of labour held
constant, would obviously provide an additional amount of tax revenue. However,
when the quantity of labour supplied falls as a result of the tax increase, there are
two offsetting effects on the amount of funds available for public good provision:
the forgone tax revenues on the quantity of labour withdrawn from the market; and
the additional tax revenues need to finance the increased eligibility for benefits as
a result of the decline in earnings. The fOlmer effect represents an efficiency or
dead-weight loss to the economy, and while the latter effect is a transfer it also
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influences the cost of public funds because of the need for higher tax rates to fund
the expansion of benefit programmes as well as the public good. A recent study by
Ca::npbell and Bond (1997a), updating the Findlay and lones estimates, indicates
that there is a dead-weight loss in the range 19-24 cents for every dollar allocated
to public good provision in Australia.
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